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PEDAGOGICAL SUBVERSION IN CLINICAL
TEACHING: THE WOMEN & THE LA W CLINIC AND
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLINIC AS LEGAL
ARCHAEOLOGY
Ann Shalleck*
Legal pedagogy provides an important site for the subversion of
dominant conceptions of law. For more than two decades, feminist law
teachers have sought to enable our students to understand how the law
interacts with social power to shape women's experience in society, to
critique how the law operates in any particular situation with regard to
gender, and to convey how lawyers have space to shape new legal tools
that challenge the oppression of women in society. Feminist law teachers
have taught about how the discourse of the law affects women's lives and
how the material forces that shape women's experiences are related to legal
rules and legal institutions. We have designed methods both to help
students analyze problematic conceptions of women and gender that appear
in legal texts and to foster in students alternative ways of approaching law
that help to challenge oppressive practices that harm women. Thus,
throughout its history, feminist pedagogy has had both a critical and a
transformative agenda.
Our pedagogical efforts have developed over time, reflecting our
changing understandings of the relationship of law, sex, and gender. They
reflect the constraints and possibilities that have confronted us within the
context of our particular educational institutions. As are other forms of
feminist thought and action, feminist legal pedagogy is dynamic. Feminist
pedagogical innovations may be suppressed or embraced; they may be
ridiculed or celebrated. A feminist pedagogical innovation, once
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introduced, not only changes the contours of legal pedagogy, but is
changed itself. What begins as subversive may be accommodated,
distorted, expanded, or transformed once it becomes a part of legal
academic culture. Therefore, as with all aspects of feminist legal thought
and action, we must constantly reassess the impact and meaning of our
pedagogical practices.
Despite recurring challenges from a variety of critical perspectives,
American legal education, to a great extent, has continued to be about the
authoritative pronouncements of doctrine by courts.' Primarily, students
read and dissect appellate cases. Statutes and administrative rules make a
supporting appearance, as do excerpts from other disciplines. Many law
teachers, among them feminists, have, within the spaces available to them
at their own institutions, introduced modifications of this basic model.2
1. The other members of this panel on Subversive Pedagogies share my perception
about the dominant content and form of contemporary legal education. Patricia A. Cain &
Linda K. Kerber, Subversive Moments: Challenging the Traditions of Constitutional
History, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 91, 96 (2003); Deborah L. Threedy, Unearthing Subversion
Within Legal Archaeology, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 125, 126 (2003); see also Anthony G.
Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A 21st-Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612
(1984); Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Lawyering Revolution and Legal Education, 2-4, 6,
10 (1985) (unpublished paper presented at the Cambridge Lectures, July 15, 1985, on file
with author) [hereinafter Amsterdam, The Lawyering Revolution]; Gary Blasi,
Teaching/Lawyering as an Intellectual Project, 14 J. PROF. LEGAL EDUC. 65, 65 (1996);
Kimberld Williams Crenshaw, Forward: Toward a Race Conscious Pedagogy in Legal
Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 3 (1989); James Eagar, Comment, The Right Tool for
the Job: The Effective Use of Pedagogical Methods in Legal Education, 32 GONz. L. REV.
389, 390, 393, 395 (1996-97); Jay Feinman & Marc Feldman, Pedagogy and Politics, 73
GEo. L.J. 875, 877-78, 882-83 (1985); Steven I. Friedland, The Use of Appellate Case
Report Ananlysis in Modern Legal Education: How Much Is Too Much?, 10 NOVA L.J. 495,
495 (1986); Robert W. Gordon, Brendan Brown Lecture: Critical Legal Studies as a
Teaching Method, 35 LOYOLA L. REV. 383, 385-89 n.1, 391-92 (1989); Joseph R. Grodin,
The Tunnel Vision of Legal Training, 10 NOVA L.J. 547, 547 (1986); William F. Kellman,
Feminist Methodologies in the Law School Classroom: Listening for a Change, 4 TEMP.
POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 117, 118 (1994); Duncan Kennedy, Politicizing the Classroom, 4
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN's STUD. 81 (1994) [hereinafter Kennedy, Politicizing the
Classroom]; Duncan Kennedy, The Political Significance of the Structure of the Law School
Curriculum, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 3, 13-15 (1983) [hereinafter The Political
Significance]; Robert B. McKay, What Law Schools Can and Should Do (and Sometimes
Do), 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 491, 494-95 (1985); Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case
Method: It's Time to Teach With Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 241, 241 (1992); John Henry
Schlegel, Searching for Archimedes-Legal Education, Legal Scholarship, and Liberal
Ideology, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 103, 107-08 (1984); Ann Shalleck, Constructions of the Client
Within Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1733-37 (1993) [hereinafter Constructions
of the Client]; Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical
Education, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577, 577, 581-89 (1987).
2. Amsterdam, The Lawyering Revolution, supra note 1, at 17-23; Leslie Bender, An
Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 575 (1993); Leslie Bender,
Teaching Feminist Perspectives on Health Care Ethics and Law: A Review Essay, 61 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1251 (1993); Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's Primer of Feminist Theory and Tort,
Vol. 13:113
Pedagogical Subversion in Clinical Teaching
Some use critical readings to expose students to multiple and conflicting
interpretations of cases.3 Others conduct simulations in which students
38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988); Anita Bernstein, A Feminist Revisit to the First-Year
Curriculum, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 217 (1996); Susan Bisom-Rapp, Contextualizing the
Debate: How Feminist and Critical Race Scholarship Can Inform the Teaching of
Employment Discrimination Law, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 366 (1994); Patricia A. Cain, Teaching
Feminist Legal Theory at Texas: Listening to Difference and Exploring Connections, 38 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 165 (1988); Peggy Cooper Davis & Elizabeth Ehrenfest Steinglass, A
Dialogue About Socratic Teaching, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 249, 250-52, 275
(1997); Crenshaw, supra note 1, at 8-9, 12-14; Marc Feldman, On the Margins of Legal
Education, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 607 (1984-1985); Lucinda Finley, Women's
Experience in Legal Education: Silence and Alienation, 1 LEGAL EDUC. REV. 101, 105-06
(1989); Phyllis Goldfarb, Beyond Cut Flowers: Developing a Clinical Perspective on
Critical Legal Theory, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 717, 727-39 (1992); Gordon, supra note 1, at 384-
85, 389-92, 394-407; Bill Ong Hing, Raising Personal Identification Issues of Class, Race,
Ethnicity, Gender, Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1807 (1993); Kellman, supra note 1, at 120, 126-29; Kennedy, Political
Significance, supra note 1, at 3-8; Kennedy, Politicizing the Classroom, supra note 1, at
81-82; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Mainstreaming Feminism in Legal Education, 53 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 199 (2003); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations
on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or "The Fem-
Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61 (1988); Elliott S. Milstein, Clinical
Education, Indeterminacy and the Reform of the Law School Curriculum 28 (2002)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author); Michael Penn, Feminist Pedagogy as Praxis,
4 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y 217 (1997); Banu Ramachandran, Re-Reading Difference:
Feminist Critiques of the Law School Classroom and the Problem of Speaking from
Experience, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1757 (1998); Judith Resnik, Revisiting the Canon: Feminist
Help in Teaching Procedure, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181 (1993); Judith Resnik, Visible on
"Women's Issues," 77 IOWA L. REV. 41 (1991); Deborah L. Rhode, Missing Questions:
Feminist Perspectives on Legal Education, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1558-60 (1993);
Spiegel, supra note 1; Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting
Conversations About Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4 DUKE J. GENDER L.
& POL'Y 119 (1997); Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical Pedagogy and
Social Justice Activism: Marking the Stirrings of Critical Legal Education, 10 ASIAN L.J.
65, 67-68, 72-74, 85-88 (2003) [hereinafter Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence]; Francisco
Valdes, Barely at the Margins: Race and Ethnicity in Legal Education-A Curricular Study
with LatCritical Commentary, 13 LA RAZA L.J. 119 (2002); Susan Williams, Legal
Education, Feminist Epistemology, and the Socratic Method, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1571 (1993);
Barbara B. Woodhouse, Mad Midwifery: Bringing Theory, Doctrine, and Practice to Life,
91 MICH. L. REV. 1977 (1993).
3. Bernstein, supra note 2, at 220, 223; Blasi, supra note 1, at 69, 71; Susan Bryant &
Elliott S. Milstein, Reflections upon the 25th Anniversary of THE LA WYERING PROCESS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE SYMPOSIUM, 10 CLN. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2003); Feinman & Feldman,
supra note 1, at 910; Mary Joe Frug, Introduction from the First Edition, in WOMEN AND
THE LAW vii (Greenberg, Minow & Roberts, eds., 2d ed. 1998); Mary Joe Frug, Re-Reading
Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a Contracts Casebook, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1065, 1074-75
(1985); Hing, supra note 2, at 1808, 1813, 1816, 1820; Charles R. Lawrence, III, Two Views
of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLuM. L. REV.
928 (2001); Jean Love, Teaching Torts: A New Perspective-Selected Cases and Articles
(Jan. 1987) (unpublished manuscript), cited in Carl Tobias, The Case for a Feminist Torts
Casebook, 38 VILL. L. REV. 1517, 1523-25 (1993); Schlegel, supra note 1, at 109-10; Ann
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work with a legal problem in the context of a lawyering activity. 4 Still
others, through clinical programs, have students provide representation to
clients under the supervision of faculty and reflect upon their activities as
lawyers, the experiences of clients, and the operation of legal institutions.5
These efforts and countless others have in large and small ways challenged
the fundamental model of American legal education. Feminist law teachers
Shalleck, Feminist Legal Theory and the Reading of O'Brien v. Cunard, 57 MO. L. REV. 371
(1992); Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, supra note 2, at 75-76, 78, 80; Williams, supra
note 2, at 1573.
4. Amsterdam, The Lawyering Revolution, supra note 1, at 17-23; Paul Bergman,
Avrom Sherr & Roger Burridge, Learning from Experience: Nonlegally-Specific Role Plays,
37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 535 (1987); Robert P. Davidow, Teaching Constitutional Law and
Related Courses Through Problem-Solving and Role-Playing, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 527
(1984); David S. Day, Teaching Constitutional Law: Role-Playing the Supreme Court, 36 J.
LEGAL EDUC 268 (1986); Davis & Steinglass, supra note 2, at 276; Donald B. King,
Simulated Game Playing in Law School: An Experiment, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 580 (1974);
Eagar, supra note 1, at 407-08; Lawrence M. Grosberg, The Buffalo Creek Disaster: An
Effective Supplement to a Conventional Civil Procedure Course, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 378
(1987); Kenney Hegland, Fun and Games in the First Year: Contracts by Roleplay, 31 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 534 (1981); Hing, supra note 2, at 1808, 1813-17, 1823, 1830-33; Howard
Lesnick, The Wellsprings of Legal Responses to Inequality: A Perspective on Perspectives,
1991 DUKE L.J. 413, 415 n.7 (1991); Howard Lesnick, Infinity in a Grain of Sand: The
World of Law and Lawyering as Portrayed in the Clinical Teaching Implicit in the Law
School Curriculum, 37 UCLA L. REV. 1157 (1990); Ramachandran, supra note 2, at 1764;
Jennifer L. Rosato, All I Ever Needed to Know About Teaching Law School I Learned
Teaching Kindergarten: Introducing Gaming Techniques into the Law School Classroom,
45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 568, 578-80 (1995); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Rethinking the Teaching of
Civil Procedure, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 41 (1987); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Structuring
Complexity, Disciplining Reality: The Challenge of Teaching Civil Procedure in a Time of
Change, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1191 (1993); Philip G. Schrag, The Serpent Strikes: Simulation
in a Large First-Year Course, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1155 (1993); Stephen N. Subrin, Teaching
Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1155 (1993);
Woodhouse, supra note 2, at 1986-88; Mary Marsh Zulack, Rediscovering Client
Decisionmaking: The Impact of Role-Playing, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 593 (1995).
5. Amsterdam, The Lawyering Revolution, supra note 1, at 17; Gary Bellow, On
Teaching the Teachers: Some Preliminary Reflections on Clinical Education as
Methodology, in CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW STUDENT 374 (Council on Legal
Education for Professional Responsibility ed., 1973); Blasi, supra note 1, at 67; Bryant &
Milstein, supra note 3, at 6-19; David Chavkin, Spinning Straw into Gold: Exploring the
Legacy of Bellow and Moulton, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 245, 256-59, 275-77 (2003)
[hereinafter Chavkin, Spinning Straw into Gold]; Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 719, 739-41;
Phyllis Goldfarb, A Theory-Practice Spiral: The Ethics of Feminism and Clinical
Education, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1599 (1991); Hing, supra note 2, at 1808-09, 1817-19, 1823;
Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Scenes from a Clinic, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1978);
Milstein, supra note 2, at 6-7, 8-9, 11, 12-14, 16-19, 21-22, 23-27; Philip G. Schrag,
Constructing a Clinic, 3 CLINICAL L. REV. 175 (1996); Ann Shalleck, Clinical Contexts:
Theory and Practice in Law and Supervision, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 109, 110,
141-78 (1994); Spiegel, supra note 2, at 589-95; Lucie E. White, Collaborative Lawyering
in the Field? On Mapping the Paths from Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 157,
158-59, 161-70 (1994); Stephen Wizner & Dennis Curtis, Here's What We Do: Some Notes
on Clinical Legal Education, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 673 (1980).
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have been at the forefront of efforts to change legal pedagogy and the
implicit lessons about law and legal institutions that it conveys.
This panel on Subversion Through Pedagogy has examined how three
different, yet related, pedagogical practices destabilize one aspect of the
dominant form of legal knowledge. The three practices all question the
assumption that law is only, or even primarily, the pronouncements of
courts and legislatures. All three pedagogies diverge from the project of
teaching a feminist critique of appellate court opinions. Engaging in
critique of cases can implicitly transmit the lesson that official
pronouncements constitute the law, even if feminist analysis of cases and
statutes is substantially different from other approaches to case analysis.
All three pedagogical practices identified here look beyond official
pronouncements to find the law.
Professor Deborah Threedy presents "legal archaeology" as a
subversive teaching tool, as well as a scholarly approach.6 When students
undertake the project of reconstructing the historical context of a case from
clues extrinsic to a court opinion itself-from trial transcripts,
contemporaneous accounts, personal narratives, and other historical
materials-they examine differently the official story as articulated by the
court and see how the official story distorts or submerges alternative
stories.7 Legal archaeology as a teaching tool, as well as a method of
analysis, subverts the dominant form of legal understanding in at least three
ways.
First, legal archaeology conveys unsettling ideas about what is worthy
of study.8 The materials of legal archaeology force students to see the texts
and sources outside the confines of the court opinion as essential to
knowledge of what the law is. Only through these materials can the
students construct other stories about the operation of law and comprehend
how and why the official story of law assumes its form and content. Many
contemporary law students are strikingly similar to Christopher Columbus
Langdell, seeking conceptual rules from appellate decisions, or to a
caricatured legal realist, viewing appellate rules through an ungrounded
appeal to functional interests (such as predictability, efficiency, flexibility,
or fairness) termed "policy." 9 They inhabit the world of the law library
(now the virtual world of computerized legal sources) in the quest to know
the law. 10 Beyond the realms of Lexis and Westlaw lies a different
territory.1 Law school implicitly tells these students that materials beyond
6. Threedy, supra note 1, at 128.
7. Id. at 127.
8. Id. at 128.
9. Feinman & Feldman, supra note 1, at 882; Gordon, supra note 1, at 391.
10. Cain & Kerber, supra note 1, at 102; Grodin, supra note 1, at 548.
11. Professors Cain & Kerber share my perception of students' reluctance to seek
knowledge beyond traditional legal sources. Cain & Kerber, supra note 1, at 102. Perhaps
2003
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legal pronouncements are secondary to legal knowledge. 12  Legal
archaeology requires students to develop an appreciation of diverse
materials in order to understand the law.
1 3
Second, legal archaeology demands a method different than the one
propounded in law schools. Deciphering the court's opinion is only one
part of analyzing the story of the law. Students must search for the diverse
and conflicting narratives that coexisted when the court constructed the
official account. They must look to what is "irrelevant" from the
perspective of the official story because the point is to recover the very
narratives that the court rejected or ignored. Seeing the range of
assumptions embedded in the conflicting stories and analyzing the choices
fixed in the court's account, the student can begin to decipher the reasons
driving the construction of the official story. 14
Third, legal archaeology alters the content of legal knowledge. Law is
the amalgam of conflicting stories told by different people, in different
relationships to the legal system, in different segments of society. When
our students unearth these narratives, they see what law is in its
complexity, contradictions, and ambiguities. In the interaction of stories,
the students can track the relationship of law as written and law as
experienced, the impact on people's lives of legal and social institutions
through which legal experience is mediated, and the relationship of law and
social power. Legal archaeology helps unmask how law is used by those
with power and by those without.
15
In legal archaeology, students confront the importance of facts. They
quickly discover that mastering legal doctrine, even in all its indeterminacy
and mutability, is of only limited value in discerning how any particular
case or set of cases develops. The students must take facts seriously1 6 and
learn methods of factual analysis that incorporate an appreciation for the
intricacies, contradictions, indeterminacies, and uncertainties of facts. As
critical legal thought has problematized legal analysis, legal archaeology
problematizes factual analysis.
One way to see the Gender & Constitutional History course created by
the students are not so dissimilar from many of their teachers. Gordon, supra note 1, at 391.
12. Even students who embrace legal perspectives that would seem to require
knowledge and analysis from beyond legal texts, such as law and economics, frequently
tend to rely on the official pronouncements about how those materials should inform legal
decision making. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 391-92.
13. Threedy, supra note 1, at 127.
14. Id.; see also Naomi R. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, 81 GEO. L.J. 2475, 2480-81,
2485-88, 2495, 2514 (1993) [hereinafter Cahn, Inconsistent Stories].
15. Threedy, supra note 1, at 132; see also John M. Conley & William M. O'Barr,
Hearing the Hidden Agenda: The Ethnographic Investigation of Procedure, 51 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 181 (1988); Austin Sarat, "... The Law is All Over": Power, Resistance,
and the Legal Consciousness of the Welfare Poor, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 343 (1990).
16. Threedy, supra note 1, at 133-34.
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Professors Patricia Cain and Linda Kerber, is as an experience in legal
archaeology. 17 Professors Cain and Kerber have transformed the narrative
of constitutional doctrine, which drives most constitutional law courses,
into a narrative of women's experience with constitutional law in the
historical, social, and political context of the time. Doctrinal categories do
not shape the accounts the students study. Rather, constitutional doctrine
inscribes the ways women have attempted to remedy an injustice or have
used the law to change their position in society. The students study
constitutional law as it reflects and affects women's social and political
power.
The course demonstrates how decoding the operation of gender is a
central component in an archaeological project. 18  Understanding
constitutional history requires examining the workings of gender in the
world. Therefore, as students discover the underlying accounts of women
in cases that employ constitutional doctrine, they see women's experience
not divided by legal category, but grounded in a specific historical period
characterized by particular normative structures of thought affecting
concepts of gender, the experience of gender, and doctrines of
constitutional law. Students search through archives to uncover clues from
the multiple stories that eventually resulted in the narrative in the court's
opinion. From these factual clues, they develop avenues of investigation.
They probe to uncover the women's experiences and thoughts. They
discover how legal, political, and social institutions functioned in the
women's lives. They explore the political and social forces that affected
the women, the lawyers, and the courts. From this information, the
students construct the multiple stories outside the official account that
nonetheless constitute constitutional law. Without these other stories, the
court's opinions mask how constitutional law operates with respect to
gender. With these alternative narratives, the students can better interpret
why the doctrines of constitutional law are constructed as they are, evaluate
the choices implicit in the official doctrinal narrative, and imagine how
constitutional doctrines might be constructed differently.
This course also furthers the archaeological project by respecting
chronology. 19 Constitutional law casebooks, which convey the dominant
20accounts of constitutional law, are structured around doctrinal categories.
These doctrinal classifications often distort the interrelationships of
multiple aspects of women's experiences. Women's lives as workers,
citizens, caregivers, and reproductive individuals are disconnected from
each other and addressed only as their activities appear within each
17. Cain & Kerber, supra note 1, at 91, 95-97, 102-03.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 91.
20. Id.
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doctrinal context. Thus, the doctrinal stories obscure the interconnections
among women's constitutional claims regarding the multiple aspects of
their lives. Furthermore, the doctrinal organization undermines stories of
structures of oppression told through feminist social movements. Many
social movements of women framed constitutional claims to equality,
fairness, and participation in the life of society within the context of
opposition to patriarchal structures of power.2' In this course, unlike in
most other constitutional law courses, students do not learn to fit past cases
into a current doctrinal matrix. Rather, in finding the alternative stories of
individuals and social movements, students immerse themselves in the
ways of thought and structures of society in which women lived, social
movements developed, and the doctrines of constitutional law of the time
took shape. They come to understand the processes by which the official
accounts of women's oppression were chosen over others or shaped in
interaction with other competing stories.
Clinical courses, too, can subvert the understanding of law as
authoritative pronouncement. In this article, I analyze two clinical courses
I teach at American University, Washington College of Law as experiences
in legal archaeology. In both the Women & the Law Clinic22 and the
Intellectual Property Clinic,23 students experience the methodological and
substantive subversions of legal archaeology. In the Women & the Law
Clinic, as in Professors Cain and Kerber's Gender & Constitutional History
course, the importance of gender to subversion is apparent. In the
Intellectual Property Clinic, as in many other courses that do not explicitly
address gender, the subversions identified by legal archaeology present the
possibility of revealing how gender is part of the stories excluded from the
official accounts of the law. Although the focus of legal archaeology may
often be on the past, its methods can be equally useful in reconceiving law
in the present. Therefore, as Gender & Constitutional History can be seen
as an example of legal archaeology, so can student representation of clients
in the Women & the Law Clinic and the Intellectual Property Clinic.
In both clinics, the students focus not on issues of doctrine, but on the
activities involved in lawyering. As they represent a client under the
supervision of a faculty member and as part of a structured clinical course,
students engage in and analyze the activities of the lawyer. They
21. Id. at 91.
22. The Women & the Law Clinic is a two-semester, fourteen-credit course in which
students represent clients in a wide variety of legal actions, while simultaneously studying
the theory and practice of lawyering in a seminar organized around simulated cases that
draws on readings about lawyering and about the operation of gender in the legal system.
23. The Glushko-Samuelson Intellectual Property Law Clinic is a two-semester,
fourteen-credit course in which students represent individuals and groups in matters
involving intellectual property and examine how legal categories that construct intellectual
property have an impact on the public interest.
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experience the development of their relationship with a client, and they
undertake all the tasks involved in representing that person or group. In the
class, they explore the dynamics and nature of their relationship with the
client; understand the client's often changing view of the situation; reflect
upon each choice they make as lawyers in shaping and pursuing the legal
matter(s) in the client's life; analyze the institutions that mediate the
client's experience with legal rules and procedures; and examine the
interaction of legal concepts, rules, and procedures with social and political
power.
Although the structure of these two clinical courses, like many other
clinical courses, requires the students to engage in work that differs greatly
from the reading and analysis of appellate cases, the differences between
the activities in a clinical course and those in any other law school course
do not necessarily entail a challenge to the idea of law as the official
account constructed by courts and legislatures. The message of a clinical
course could be that lawyers engage in the process of applying "the law" as
propounded by courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies to the
particular "facts" of a client's case. This approach to clinical study would
reinforce rather than subvert the concept of law as authoritative
pronouncement. The students' activity as lawyers, the experiences and
stories of the client, the meanings that clients, students, and other actors in
the situation attribute to the different aspects of the representation, and the
social and historical context within which representation develops could be
seen as interesting and important but not part of "the law."
A clinical course, although not inherently subversive, creates multiple
opportunities to learn a different way to understand what constitutes the
law.24 Three elements that characterize both the Women & the Law Clinic
and the Intellectual Property Clinic, as well as other clinical courses
throughout the country, echo the methodological and substantive
subversions of legal archaeology that are essential to the project of
conveying a different understanding of what the law is and how it operates.
24. Chavkin, Spinning Straw into Gold, supra note 5, at 133; Spiegel, supra note 2, at
590-91; Stephen Wizner, Beyond Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 327 (2001). For
examples of clinical approaches that reject the model of law as constituted by official
pronouncement, see Susan D. Bennett, "No relief but upon the terms of coming into the
house "-Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements, and Homelessness in an Urban
Shelter System, 104 YALE L.J. 2157 (1995); Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court:
Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 533 (1992); see also PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF
LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); William L.F. Felstiner & Austin Sarat,
Enactments of Power: Negotiating Reality and Responsibility in Lawyer-Client Interactions,
77 CO RNELL L. REV. 1447 (1997); Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients: Putting Professional
Service on the Agenda of Legal Education, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 43 (1991); Sarat, supra note
15; Barbara Yngvesson, Inventing Law in Social Settings: Rethinking Popular Legal
Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1689 (1989).
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First, the activities of the lawyer and the client are worthy of study.
While lawyering has come to be a part of the curriculum of most law
schools in the form of clinical programs, legal academia still contests that
focusing upon the activities of the lawyer comprises more than a "skills"
course, a course in how to apply the law as it is transmitted in the rest of
the curriculum. 25  Therefore, the analysis of lawyering undermines the
dominant conception of law as authoritative text only when the activities of
the lawyer are treated as an aspect of law creation and elaboration.26 The
reconceptualization of lawyering as part of law is a central component of
the subversive potential of a clinic. For example, in the Women & the Law
Clinic, when students represent a woman who has been abused in an
intimate relationship, they learn about the law of domestic violence from
the clues they find outside the cases or statutes, or even outside of the
formal court procedures they might employ as part of a case. They learn
about how the client's experience of being physically harmed by someone
close to her becomes a subject of the law. They struggle to learn what the
experience means for that woman. They must acknowledge and destabilize
their own frameworks for understanding her experience. They grope
towards learning how to accept her framework and not impose their own
through the conscious or unconscious use of their power within the
relationship. They discover that the woman's understanding of her
situation is often dynamic, changing as she repeatedly reinterprets her
experience in light of her interactions with other people, the history of the
relationship in which the abuse occurred, her feelings for the person who
harmed her, her material resources, her other needs, the response of the
lawyer, her interactions with others during the steps in the legal process,
her attitudes toward the law and the legal system, and factors that remain
elusive. Students meet people who are angry at their client for causing the
25. Although many law schools continue to define their clinical courses as "skills"
courses, this vision of clinical education has been consistently challenged. For a fuller
discussion, see Ann Shalleck, Toward a Jurisprudence of Clinical Thought 20-24 (paper
presented at the Robert N. Endries Distinguished Faculty Workshop Series, April 12, 2002,
manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter Shalleck, Toward a Jurisprudence]; see also
Bryant & Milstein, supra note 3, at 1203-06, 1208, 1215-16; Chavkin, Spinning Straw into
Gold, supra note 5, at 132.
26. Amsterdam, The Lawyering Revolution, supra note 1, at 12; Gerald P. Lopez, The
Work We Know So Little About, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1, 9-11 (1989); Gerald P. Lopez,
Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a Rebellious Collaboration,
77 GEo. L.J. 1603, 1608 (1989) [hereinafter Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice];
Gerald P. Lopez, Training Future Lawyers to Work with the Politically and Socially
Subordinated: Anti-Generic Legal Education, 91 W. VA. L. REv. 305, 322 (1989); Chavkin,
Spinning Straw into Gold, supra note 5, at 133; Shalleck, Toward a Jurisprudence, supra
note 25, at 15-20; Shalleck, Constructions of the Client, supra note 1, at 1744-46; Lucie
White, Paradox, Piece Work, and Patience, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 853, 855 (1992); Lucie E.
White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing
of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REv. 1, 45-50 (1990) [hereinafter White, Subordination].
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abuse or for remaining in a relationship in which abuse occurs. They deal
with officials, from court personnel to judges, child welfare workers, and
prosecutors, who often think they know what is best for the woman and for
society. Students encounter court procedures and court forms that serve to
limit the scope and applicability of the legal action.27
Students are often surprised to see that a legal action originally sought
by feminists as a legal tool for providing women some protection from
dangerous situations of domestic violence has been transformed into a
routinized set of procedures that often distort women's experiences,
endanger them further, threaten their custody of their children, fail to
address the range of needs women in abusive relationships have, and
operate differently depending on race, ethnicity, and class. 28 Students who
enter the clinic thinking that the official rubric of legal actions to enjoin
abusive behavior by a family member or an intimate partner constitutes the
legal framework for addressing domestic violence soon see that they must
listen to and absorb the multiple stories of intimate violence in order even
to begin to comprehend how these experiences take on meaning in the legal
system. If students try to squeeze their client into the statutory categories
and requirements or counsel her to fit within judicial expectations of how
an abused woman should behave, they feel the multiple tensions among the
woman's experience as conveyed to them, the reactions of others to her
situation, and the construction of the legal rules. 29 Thus, students discover
that the material they find in the world is essential to the law of domestic
violence. Furthermore, they learn that these tensions are not irrelevancies
27. Susan Bryant & Maria Arias, Case Study: A Battered Women's Rights Clinic:
Designing a Clinical Program Which Encourages a Problem-Solving Vision of Lawyering
that Empowers Clients and Community, 42 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 207, 216, 219-
20 (1992); Calm, Inconsistent Stories, supra note 14, at 2487-88, 2490-91; Naomi Cahn,
The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable Woman Standard in Theory and in
Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1398, 1442-46 (1992) [hereinafter Calm, Looseness of Legal
Language]; Leslie G. Espinoza, Legal Narratives, Therapeutic Narratives: The Invisibility
and Omnipresence of Race and Gender, 95 MICH. L. REV. 901, 908-09, 911-12 (1997);
Phyllis Goldfarb, Describing Without Circumscribing: Questioning the Construction of
Gender in the Discourse of Intimate Violence, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 582, 614 (1996);
Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 2-4 (1991);
Ann Shalleck, Theory and Experience in Constructing the Relationship Between Lawyer
and Client: Representing Women Who Have Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REv. 1019, 1033-34,
1040-44 (1997).
28. Calm, Inconsistent Stories, supra note 14, at 2487; Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with
the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges to Protect Battered Women, 11
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 499, 509-14 (2003).
29. Laurie S. Kohn, Barriers to Reliable Credibility Assessments: Domestic Violence
Victim-Witnesses, 11 AM U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 733, 736, 747 (2003); Mahoney,
supra note 27, at 11, 16, 36; Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality:
Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
529, 552 (1992).
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to be suppressed or bemoaned. 30 Rather, they provide a starting point for
lawyers to engage in a constant process of seeking to reshape the law to
reflect their discoveries about women's experience of domestic violence.
With this knowledge and experience, the students are poised to question
how and why the law of intra-family offenses came to be as it is and how it
could be different.
As in the Women & the Law Clinic, the students in the Intellectual
Property Clinic must listen for and identify clues that exist outside of
formal legal materials in order to understand the law. In representing a
woman inventor seeking to claim infringement of her patent, the students in
the clinic must look past the law of infringement. As they face the limited
nature and scope of the type of their client's patent, they pursue clues about
the conditions under which she obtained that patent. By following these
clues, they discover an invention submission company and unravel the
circumstances under which the firm induced her to pay for a worthless
patent. They see that the operation of this company, the company's
connections to other firms, the client's aspirations in contracting for the
services, and her interactions with its representatives are critical to
understanding the limitations she faces in claiming that others have
improperly taken and used her invention. Had the students not listened
carefully to all parts of her account, in particular those that appeared
"irrelevant" to her intellectual property claim, the students could easily
have concluded that the law did not provide her with the remedy she
wanted. According to the doctrines of patent law, she could not stop large
corporations from producing products similar to the one for which she had
obtained a patent. The students' activity would have been to counsel their
client about how the law would not secure for her the legal remedy that she
thought she deserved.
Instead, the students probe to find out the desires their client
articulated to the representatives of the patent submission firm about
patenting and marketing her invention. They call upon the client to
remember the representations made to her by the representatives of the
patent submission firm; they comb through the brochures and the
promotional materials of the firm; they identify the actions the firm took to
secure her a patent; they document the actions the client took in response to
the advice of the firm's representatives. While they calculate the money
that their client paid to (and borrowed from) an interconnected web of
companies to obtain its "services," the students slowly decipher her
motivations and reasons for committing so many financial resources over
the extended course of her interactions with the firm, when she had so little
30. See, e.g., BARBARA YNGVESSON, VIRTUOUS CITIZENS, DISRUPTIVE SUBJECTS: ORDER
AND COMPLAINT IN A NEW ENGLAND COURT (1993); David Engel & Frank Munger, Rights,
Remembrance, and the Reconciliation ofDifference, 30 L. & Soc'Y REv. 7 (1996).
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money. They hear about her hopes as she took each step in her relationship
with the firm. They encounter the client's religious fervor about making
her invention available to other women. They discover the trust she
brought to her relationship with the invention submission firm. They
examine the services that the company provided in return for her money
and her trust. Through the course of the representation, as the client learns
about the failures, inadequacies, and deceptions of the invention
submission firm, of the collusion among a web of legal entities surrounding
the company, the students must address their client's disappointment,
anger, and sense of injustice. They work with her to explore new ways to
address the limitations of the patent that the firm obtained for her. They
wonder if, as an African-American woman, she was affected by
assumptions about race and gender in her dealings with the invention
submission firm. With their knowledge and experience, the students in the
Intellectual Property Clinic are in a position to explore how the work of the
inventor, the process of invention, and financial gains from entrepreneurial
effort are shaped by money, power, and access to lawyers.
The second subversive element of both clinical courses is the
methodology of searching for diverse and conflicting stories. The
interaction of these stories and the interplay with the construction of the
official story, reveal the operation of the law. Lawyering, like legal
archaeology, is about discovering, constructing, and articulating multiple
stories. However, in the representation of a client, unlike in legal
archaeology, the most important account is the story that develops in the
relationship with the client. In the context of representing a client, the
account the client wants told, as decided through interaction with the
lawyer, is primary. At the center of the lawyer-client relationship is
working with the client to identify, understand, and continually reformulate
her different stories, particularly in light of the ways these narratives
interact with legal doctrine and ethical and professional norms.
Although the story or stories of the client have a privileged status in
the students' work representing clients, students, to be effective lawyers,
must also discover, understand, and sometimes reconceive and reformulate
31
the narratives of others who are part of the case. In addition, students
31. Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, supra note 14, at 2475-78, 2480-81, 2485-87, 2493-95,
2514, 2528; Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REV. 971, 1024,
1039-51 (1991); Anthony V. Alfieri, Stances, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1233, 1233-34; Gary
Bellow & Martha Minow, Introduction: Rita's Case and Other Law Stories, in LAW
STORIES, 1-4 (Gary Bellow & Martha Minnow eds., 1996); Robert D. Dinerstein, A
Meditation on the Theoretics of Practice, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 971, 985 (1992); Charles R.
Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as Struggle, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 2231, 2270 (1992); Lopez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice, supra note 26, at 1613;
Deborah Maranville, Feminist Theory and Legal Practice: A Case Study on Unemployment
Compensation Benefits and the Male Norm, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1081 (1992); Vicki Schultz,
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must discern the available, or stock stories, that underlie legal doctrines or
legal practice. 32 More importantly, they need to learn to interpret the space
that they can create or occupy for telling alternative stories. Helping a
client decide whether to conform to stock stories or how far to depart from,
to alter, to challenge, or to ignore these stories pervades the students'
activity. When understood this way, the work of the lawyer, whether
labeled as interviewing, counseling, investigation, negotiation, making
opening and closing statements, or examining witnesses, is about stories.
An awareness of multiple stories drives these lawyering activities, and the
accounts that are told throughout the process of representation reflect the
work of the lawyer in each activity of client representation. Clinical
scholars have often reframed the idea of storytelling centered on the client
as "case theory" and "client theory," but both concepts have storytelling at
their core.34
Returning to the domestic violence case in the Women & the Law
Clinic, the students constantly use the information they obtain from the
multiple sources they consult to frame different stories. In working with
the client, they become increasingly comfortable with the processes that the
client goes through in understanding her own experience. The students
must constantly listen for how the story changes based on developments in
the client's relationships, feelings, sense of self, material needs, and goals.
They explore to what extent and in what ways the client sees herself as a
victim and in what ways she feels like and acts as an agent in the world.
They examine how social and legal institutions constrain women's capacity
to act in the world. They are mindful of the client's understanding of the
threat to her security and possibly the security of those she cares about.
They consider the client's views of the person who was violent to her. Is
Room to Maneuver (j)or a Room of One's Own? Practice Theory and Feminist Perspective,
14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 123, 146 (1989); Lucie E. White, Seeking "... The Faces of
Otherness. . . ": A Response to Professors Sarat, Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV.
1499, 1508-09 (1992); White, Subordination, supra note 26, at 45-46.
32. Naomi Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence
on Child Custody Decisions, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1941 (1991); Lopez, Reconceiving Civil
Rights Practice, supra note 26, at 1613; Mahoney, supra note 27, at 36-38.
33. Anthony V. Alfieri, Disabled Clients, Disabling Lawyers, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 769
(1992); Cahn, Inconsistent Stories, supra note 14, at 2485, 2516-18, 2524-26; Marc A.
Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes,
and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511, 556-62 (1992);
Lawrence, supra note 31, at 2253; Kim L. Scheppele, Just the Facts Ma'am: Sexualized
Violence, Evidentiary Habits and the Revision of Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 123, 167-69
(1993); Schultz, supra note 31, at 145-46; White, Subordination, supra note 26, at 46-52.
34. DAVID CHAVKIN, CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION: A TEXTBOOK FOR LAW SCHOOL
CLINICAL PROGRAMS 39-50 (2002); Chavkin, Spinning Straw into Gold, supra note 5, at
107; Binny Miller, Problem Solving in Clinical Education: Teaching Case Theory, 9
CLINICAL L. REV. 293 (2002); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing
Client Narrative in Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994).
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he a perpetrator? A companion? A monster? A father to her children? A
victim himself? A provider? These multiple, sometimes conflicting,
characterizations of self and others come from not only a woman's own
experience, but also the prevailing images of men and women in situations
of domestic violence. As the students counsel the client about the
possibility of filing a court action, they gauge how the narratives that
dominate the court system and social service systems will interact with the
story the client wants to tell. And they must discover the story that the
person who abused her will probably tell. They formulate a story to
present to the court. As in legal archaeology, the students' search for these
diverse stories is central to the law. In the identification and articulation of
these disparate and conflicting narratives, students see law in the making.
In the Intellectual Property Clinic, students similarly search for
multiple stories about their client's experience of seeking and obtaining a
patent for her invention. They, like the students in the Women & the Law
Clinic, must be aware of their client's shifting perceptions of herself and
others. She is proud of herself as a creative person. When she sees
products on the shelves of the supermarket similar to the one for which she
obtained a patent, she is indignant that large corporations are making
money from an invention she believes she developed before they did. She
thinks that her invention would have helped other women. She sees her
work as part of a religious mission. She wants to believe that the people at
the invention submission company meant to help her. She is disillusioned
by the misrepresentations they made to her, and she is dismayed by the
company's failure to obtain anything of value for her. She is angry that
they took so much of her money. She is embarrassed about being misled.
She is angry at their betrayal of her. She is outraged at being manipulated
and exploited by a large and complicated company that systematically took
advantage of the dreams of inventors with few resources. She wants to
help others who may be similarly harmed.
While discovering their client's shifting stories, the students also seek
to know the multiple accounts of the invention submission company. Is it a
legitimate enterprise attempting to make complex and highly technical
services available at a reasonable cost to ordinary people who would not on
their own be able to obtain help in protecting and marketing their products?
Is it a sleazy operation in league with other operations, preying upon
vulnerable people who do not have much income beyond what they need to
live? Are they creative entrepreneurs who have identified a need in the
market for patents and have filled that need? Have they behaved honorably
by following the laws designed to protect consumers? Did they fully
disclose to the client that she was unlikely to make money from her
invention? If so, does that disclosure constitute sufficient openness? Have
they "cleaned up their act" by complying with a consent decree they
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entered several years earlier? Or have they interpreted every requirement
as narrowly as possible in an attempt to continue to induce people to buy
worthless services?
As in the representation of a client in a situation of domestic violence,
the students who represent the woman with the patent encounter and
construct and respond to diverse and conflicting stories. The interaction of
the conflicting stories about a woman, a patent, and a company comprises
critical information about the law of patents, information excluded from the
doctrines of the law. When the students comprehend the official account of
patent law within the context of these conflicting stories, they know the law
differently. The doctrines regarding the nature and scope of patents are
neutral, seemingly equally accessible to all. However, in the multiple
stories of the client and in the conflicts of the client's stories with the
stories of the invention submission company, the students confront how the
formal doctrines of patent law erase an understanding of how patents are
realized and given effect in the world, depending upon the position and
resources of the individual seeking a patent.
Third, both clinical courses mirror the subversions of legal
archaeology by reshaping the content of legal knowledge. When students
listen to the shifting stories of their client and of others; when they frame
and reframe stories; when they see how the stories interact with each other;
when the students develop their capacities as lawyers to affect those stories;
when they analyze the possibilities of and limits to gaining acceptance of
some of those stories; when they see the power that operates as some
stories are elevated over others; and when they explore how legal doctrine
can be transformed within the legal system to produce results in tension
with those intended, they learn law in a subversive way. In experiencing
how the stories people tell are connected to their different relationships to
the legal system, they gain an understanding of how the law operates.
Because the stories are frequently complex, chaotic, inconsistent, and
ambiguous, the law is difficult to grasp. Nonetheless, these stories reveal
the law as experienced, the law as mediated through legal and social
institutions, and the law as connected to the exercise of power. Without the
lawyer's constant attention to stories in the present life of a case (or without
the legal archaeologist's efforts to uncover those stories in the cases of the
past), the law appears as an abstract pronouncement, distinct from the clash
of stories, the disputes among people, the conflicts among groups, the
activities of social movements, and the exercise of power.
When students in the Women & the Law Clinic look outside the
official story about domestic violence, they experience how focusing on the
substantive and procedural aspects of civil protection orders constricts their
legal knowledge. The legal rules, procedures, and remedies alone often fail
their client, as they embody limiting and sometimes damaging assumptions
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about women's experience of violence, do not embrace the range of effects
that violence has in women's lives, and can expose women to greater
danger than they faced before seeking or obtaining an order. The students
also face the operation of power as they come to know the meaning of
violence in the woman's life. The students feel the consequences of the
choices they make with the client in constructing stories and in handling
conflicts in the stories.
These consequences come in many forms. If students do not hear
their client's story in a way that makes her feel comfortable or if they
distort her story, she may abandon legal actions that might otherwise help
her. If they frame her story too narrowly within the confines of existing
legal categories, the client may seek through the court system relief that she
would more safely and effectively obtain elsewhere. If the client decides to
proceed with a court action, the students face the exercise of judicial
power. The choice of stories is, at the moment of decision, not just about
narrative or history. The choice affects whether a client seeks and/or gets
the relief that the legal system offers, whatever its limitations and
distortions. Therefore, students immediately and concretely experience the
effects of consulting multiple sources, framing stories, and analyzing the
conflicts among the amalgam of narratives. The materials that they consult
throughout their representation and the stories that they encounter and
shape enable them to comprehend the law of domestic violence as one
arena for contemporary struggles over how a woman can achieve not just
meaningful safety, but also the capacity to participate fully in relationships
and in society, free from oppressive constraints such as systematic
violence.
As students represent other women in the clinic in other types of legal
actions, and as they approach their work with all their clients in a similar
fashion, they also begin to relate the mixture of stories in those cases to the
stories in the original domestic violence case. Students may not emerge
from a year in the Women & the Law Clinic with a well-developed
understanding of how the multiple stories in the different spheres of
women's lives intersect with each other, but they do begin to appreciate
how law is a site for contesting the numerous ways that women in many
different situations continue to be excluded, constrained, discriminated
against, and oppressed, depending upon their particular position in society.
With this vision of law, students are better able to see themselves as
capable of acting as lawyers to help women who must fight against the
official accounts contained in the legal system or want to use the legal
system or other social institution to reshape possibilities in their own lives
or in the lives of other women.
Students in the Intellectual Property Clinic, by looking outside the
official story about patents, also realize that they must approach patent law
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from outside its doctrines in order to understand how it operates. Patents
are accessible to inventors who occupy privileged positions in society. The
students find out how a patent is only one element in making an invention
valuable in the world. Resources and economic organizations are also
needed. They become conscious of the space for exploiting vulnerable
people who do not begin with power or resources for obtaining and
benefiting from the rights that the legal rules of patents create. They begin
to comprehend one woman's impulse to invent and have others benefit
from her invention. When they recognize the partial and distorted quality
of the dominant stories about inventors and the process of invention, they
question why those stories conflict with the experiences conveyed to them
by their client. The students wish they knew more about how gender and
race affect the experience of their client, and how the world of invention
and the activities of production and marketing of inventions are marked by
race and gender.
As students represent other clients who want to protect or to use those
cultural products that are labeled as "intellectual property," they discover
multiple and conflicting narratives about the process of cultural production.
They encounter writers, artists, dancers, computer programmers, historians,
archivists, scientists, librarians, music enthusiasts, journalists, and social
activists, as well as inventors, who engage in the creation of "intellectual"
works and in the use and dissemination of the products of our culture for
many purposes. The students hear and construct many conflicting accounts
of how these activities benefit society. The multiple stories, in conjunction
with reflection upon those stories in the clinic class, enable the students to
begin to see the forces shaping contemporary concepts of intellectual
property. Individuals differently situated regarding intellectual work,
powerful societal forces that generate and profit from the creation of
cultural products, and people who enjoy and value the products of culture
create complex, ambiguous, and conflicting stories about the values
implicated by the process of cultural production. With this knowledge and
experience, students begin to perceive the law of intellectual property as
embracing the sphere of cultural production.
These three subversive elements of clinical pedagogy, which also
characterize legal archaeology, all require exploring the nature and
contours of factual indeterminacy. Understanding factual indeterminacy is
as critical to the project of lawyering 35 as it is to legal archaeology. As
students in a clinical program come to appreciate the complexity,
ambiguity, and instability of the facts of any case, as well as the constraints
and the possibilities that characterize the construction of facts, they realize
35. Jerome Frank, Both Ends Against the Middle, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 189 (1951);
Milstein, supra note 2, at 11-14; Feinman & Feldman, supra note 1, at 893; Shalleck,
Toward a Jurisprudence, supra note 25, at 25-28.
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how law is fraught with factual malleability. Facts are not just given in the
world for the law to act upon. Rather, facts are embedded in situations,
institutions, and relationships. Seeing them, hearing them, finding them,
and interpreting them are parts of the larger project of understanding the
context in which they arise. Lawyers also daily confront limitations on the
malleability of facts. Part of the material world, facts are only partially
indeterminate, yet they are perceived, experienced, and understood
differently by different actors in the world. Therefore, students in a clinic
face at once both the boundaries created by the facts they encounter and the
shifting and variable nature of those boundaries. These characteristics of
facts are not incidental to the development of law. Rather, the contexts
within which facts appear and are understood are part of both an individual
case and the dynamics that shape the development of legal doctrine and
law. In both clinics, understanding factual indeterminacy as part of and not
separate from law undermines the concept of law as authoritative
pronouncement.
In the three pedagogical activities presented in this panel, challenging
the idea of law as authoritative pronouncement is part of current feminist
subversive activity. Although official pronouncements may not always be
about women or may not always implicate questions of gender, the process
of reshaping the concept of what constitutes law is important to feminist
legal theory. As the stories of the law, in their multiplicity and ambiguity,
are revealed, analyzed, and studied in law school classes, our students and
we are can better understand how gender operates in apparent and invisible
ways throughout the law. We have learned much from analysis of the
gendered assumptions underlying authoritative texts. We have explored
the contradictions and ambiguities that are inherent in those texts. Now, by
attending to the conflicting stories that constitute the law, as found in
sources outside of official pronouncements-especially those alternative
stories that have been rejected or distorted-we have much to discover
about the experiences of women as the law pervades their lives, much to
examine about the operation of power as expressed in the authoritative
stories that dominate the law, and much to explore about the possibilities
for and limitations on transformation through the stories that we tell in
seeking to change the law.
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